High Court’s Decision in Wilkinson v. Garland: Impact and Implications

In a decision dated June 24, 2024, the court in Santiago Lopez v. Garland determined it could not hear the petitioner’s challenge to an immigration judge’s (IJ) ruling. The Mexican petitioner had been denied cancellation of removal, a form of immigration relief. The court held that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Wilkinson v. Garland, it lacked jurisdiction to review the IJ’s discretionary decision.

Understanding the Legal Context

This case hinges on a critical distinction in immigration law: the difference between reviewable “questions of law” and unreviewable “discretionary decisions.”

• Cancellation of Removal: This is a form of relief for non-permanent residents facing deportation. To be eligible, an individual must meet several criteria. They must have been physically present in the U.S. for at least 10 years, have good moral character, and have no disqualifying criminal convictions. Most importantly, they must demonstrate that their removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent, or child. Even if an applicant meets all of these criteria, the immigration judge has the final say. The decision to grant or deny relief is discretionary, meaning it is a judgment call by the judge.
• Wilkinson v. Garland: The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case clarified the scope of judicial review for certain immigration decisions. The Court held that federal courts can review “mixed questions of law and fact.” This applies when an immigration judge applies a legal standard (like the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard) to a set of facts. The Court determined this was not a purely factual or discretionary decision and was therefore reviewable.

The Court’s Application of Wilkinson

In the case of Santiago Lopez, the court found that his challenge was not to a legal question but to the discretionary part of the IJ’s decision. The IJ in Lopez’s case had assumed for the sake of argument that Lopez had met the statutory requirements for eligibility, including the hardship standard. The IJ then went on to deny relief as a matter of discretion, based on a balance of positive and negative factors in the petitioner’s record. In Lopez’s case, the court noted that the IJ’s decision was based on “his history of drunk driving and disregard for U.S. laws.” The court concluded that this type of balancing of equities, where the judge weighs a petitioner’s positive factors against their negative ones, is a purely discretionary act.

Because the IJ’s decision to deny relief was an exercise of discretion, not the application of a legal standard to established facts, the court determined that it did not have the authority to review the decision. The ruling in Wilkinson allows for a review of whether the hardship standard was properly applied, but it does not open the door for a review of the ultimate discretionary decision to grant or deny relief. The court’s decision in Santiago Lopez affirms that while the scope of judicial review has expanded, it does not extend to second-guessing an immigration judge’s final discretionary judgment.