Asylum Eligibility Reaffirmed as Court Rejects BIA Ruling
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John Stones
In Alfaro Manzano v. Garland, a court held that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) made a legal error in an asylum case. The petitioner was denied asylum, but granted withholding of removal. The immigration judge (IJ) found that while his religion was a reason for his persecution, it was not “one central reason,” which is the stricter standard required for asylum. The BIA affirmed this decision, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed.
The “One Central Reason” Standard
The key issue in this case was the interpretation of the asylum standard. Under U.S. immigration law, to be granted asylum, an applicant must prove they are a refugee. This means they must show they have a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of” a protected ground, such as race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. The law requires that the protected ground be “at least one central reason” for the feared persecution. This standard can be complex, especially when persecutors have multiple motives.
The Facts of the Case
The petitioner in this case, a Jehovah’s Witness from El Salvador, was targeted by a gang. The gang members tried to extort him, but they also threatened him because he was a preacher. He spoke to young people in his community about choosing a religious life over joining a gang. The BIA and the IJ concluded that the gang’s primary motive was to extort him for money and power. They saw the religious motivation as “incidental” or “subordinate” to this main goal. They therefore denied asylum.
The Court’s Reversal
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the BIA’s decision. The court explained that a motive can be “one central reason” for persecution even if it’s not the only reason. When there are mixed motives, the protected ground must be “primary, essential, or principal” and cannot play a “minor role.” The court found that the record in this case compelled the conclusion that the petitioner’s religion was a central reason for the persecution. Even if the gang had not sought to extort him, his religious practice of preaching, which directly challenged the gang’s influence, would have been enough to cause the harm. The court held that it was an error for the BIA to treat the motives as mutually exclusive. It remanded the case back to the BIA for further proceedings. This decision is important because it clarifies the “one central reason” standard and provides a more comprehensive framework for analyzing cases with mixed motives for persecution.
